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CURING A MONUMENTAL ERROR: THE 





I will argue in this essay that any permanent display of the Ten 
Commandments on public property is presumptively unconstitutional as a 
violation of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.1  As a prefatory note, among the cases I will discuss 
is one from Haskell County, Oklahoma, which involved a Ten Commandments 
monument on the courthouse lawn of the county seat of Stigler.2  In 2010, the 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to review an order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
                                                                                                             
 * Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, University of California, San Diego; B.A., Antioch 
College; M.A. and Ph.D., Boston University Graduate School; J.D., Harvard Law School.  
Professor Irons has written extensively on issues of law and religion.  His book, God on Trial: 
Dispatches from America’s Religious Battlefields (2007), from which select portions of the present 
text are drawn, includes a chapter on Ten Commandments cases.  A longer discussion of the Ten 
Commandments cases will appear in his forthcoming book, Legal Literacy: A Guided Tour of the 
American Legal System (2011).  Mr. Irons can be contacted by e-mail at pirons@dssmail.ucsd.edu.. 
  The author would like to thank Professor Rick Tepker and the editors and staff of the Law 
Review for organizing the Symposium for which this essay was prepared, and for inviting him to 
speak.  The author extends a special word of gratitude to Georgeann Roye, the managing editor, 
who devoted many hours to guiding this essay to publication. 
 1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 2. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), rev=g 450 F. 
Supp. 2d 1273 (E.D. Okla. 2006), reh’g denied en banc, 574 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010). 
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the Tenth Circuit that the monument be removed; it was subsequently moved to 
nearby private property.3 
I have divided this essay into five parts.  Part I briefly reviews the Supreme 
Court’s rulings on Establishment Clause cases—from Everson v. Board of 
Education in 1947 through more recent cases on prayers in public schools and 
Christmas-season displays of Nativity scenes and (in a bow to ecumenism) 
Jewish menorahs—and the various judicial “tests” that have been applied in such 
cases.  Part II discusses the Court’s decisions in three Ten Commandments cases: 
Stone v. Graham, decided in 1980, and the conflicting rulings in McCreary 
County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, jointly argued and 
decided in 2005. 
Part III subjects Justice Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion in Van Orden to 
critical scrutiny; he joined the majority to invalidate the courthouse display of the 
Ten Commandments in the McCreary case, but wrote separately (without joining 
the plurality opinion) in Van Orden to uphold a Decalogue monument on the 
Texas State Capitol grounds.  Part IV examines the “confusion” resulting from 
Breyer’s concurrence and its impact on lower-court judges who were forced, in 
subsequently decided cases, to determine whether a Ten Commandments display 
was more like McCreary or Van Orden, and the results those judges reached. 
Part V discusses the case of Green v. Haskell County Board of 
Commissioners, in which a local resident challenged a Ten Commandments 
monument installed on the courthouse lawn in 2004 with the approval of the 
county commissioners.4  A federal district judge upheld the display of the 
monument in 2006,5 but a federal appellate panel reversed that decision in 2009.6 
 The County’s request for en banc review was denied later that year by a six-to-
six vote of the full appellate bench.7  The county commissioners’ lawyers 
petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari, asserting the need to resolve a 
purported “circuit split” between the Tenth Circuit panel and those in differently 
decided cases,8 but the Court denied the certiorari petition on March 1, 2010.9  
In a brief Conclusion, I will issue a challenge to defenders of Decalogue 
displays in the form of questions and a “modest proposal” to replace the Haskell 
County monument with one that is purely secular and will urge the adoption, in 
                                                                                                             
 3. 130 S. Ct. 1687; Rhett Morgan, Stigler Monument Moves to New Home, OKLAHOMAN 
(West), Mar. 18, 2010, at 22. 
 4. See 568 F.3d at 788. 
 5. See 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1296-97. 
 6. See 568 F.3d at 788, 809. 
 7. See 574 F.3d at 1235. 
 8. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Green, 130 S. Ct. 
1687 (2010) (No. 09-531), 2009 WL 3614470. 
 9. See 130 S. Ct. 1687. 
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pending and future cases, of the rule that such displays are presumptively 
unconstitutional.  Short of that, I argue that judges should apply the 
“endorsement” test, thus sparing federal judges and Supreme Court Justices the 
difficult task of deciding whether a challenged display is more like McCreary or 
Van Orden.   
I. Looking for Directions: A Brisk Hike Along the Establishment  
Clause Trail 
A. Blazing the Trail: From Ratification to Incorporation 
Surprisingly, not until 1947 did the Supreme Court decide its first 
Establishment Clause case,10 some 156 years after ratification of the First 
Amendment.11  The reason for this lengthy delay requires a brief explanation of 
the so-called incorporation doctrine.  By its terms, the First Amendment applies 
only to congressional enactments.12  This presumably leaves state and local 
governments free to legislate on issues of religion, speech, press, assembly, and 
petition.  And many state and local governments have done so in the past, often in 
ways that allowed punishment for supposedly harmful expressions of religious 
and political beliefs.  Challenges to such laws on First Amendment grounds were 
uniformly rejected by federal judges until 1925,13 when the Supreme Court wrote, 
in the case of Gitlow v. New York, “[W]e may and do assume that freedom of 
speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgement by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and 
‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
impairment by the States.”14   
This “incorporation” of the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed federal judicial review of 
state and local laws challenged as First Amendment violations and was followed 
in 1940 by a similar incorporation of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut.15  In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a state 
                                                                                                             
 10. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 11. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (1999) (observing that the Bill 
of Rights was ratified December 15, 1791). 
 12. See U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 13. See PETER IRONS, GOD ON TRIAL: DISPATCHES FROM AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS BATTLEFIELDS 
16-17 (2007). 
 14. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  Ironically, the Court in Gitlow affirmed the conviction and 
prison sentence of a Communist activist who had distributed a “Manifesto” advocating a future—
but not imminent—revolution against the capitalist system.  See id. at 655-59, 672.   
 15. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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law requiring official licensing for the public distribution of religious literature 
that was enforced only against Jehovah’s Witnesses.16 
B. Starting at the Trailhead: The Everson Case and the “Neutrality” 
Doctrine 
It was only a matter of time after the Gitlow and Cantwell rulings until the 
Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, applying it to state laws.  This happened in 1947 in the case of 
Everson v. Board of Education.17  At that time, the New Jersey township of 
Ewing had no high schools, either public or private, so high-school students 
attended public or Catholic parochial schools in the neighboring city of Trenton.18 
 Since the township also lacked school buses, students whose parents or friends 
did not drive them to school used public buses.19  To cover the bus-fare costs, 
Ewing offered tax-funded subsidies to parents who requested them,20 an average 
of $40 per family and a yearly outlay of less than $1000.21 
Arch Everson, a taxpayer in the township, challenged the subsidies in state 
court, arguing that they violated the Establishment Clause.22  After the New 
Jersey courts ruled against him, Everson sought review in the Supreme Court.23 
The resulting decision produced an odd split between the Justices.  Writing for 
the majority in a five-to-four decision, Justice Hugo Black upheld the 
reimbursement program, analogizing the bus-fare subsidies to such taxpayer-
funded “public safety” services as police and fire protection, although he 
conceded that the subsidies provided aid to parents with children in church-run 
schools and thus indirectly to the churches themselves.24  The four Everson 
dissenters, in an opinion by Justice Wiley Rutledge, answered that the subsidies 
gave “aid and encouragement to religious instruction” in parochial schools.25  In 
Rutledge’s view, the purpose of the Establishment Clause “was to create a 
complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil 
authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for 
religion.”26 
                                                                                                             
 16. See id. at 301-03; IRONS, supra note 13, at 18-19. 
 17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 18. See id. at 30 n.7 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 19. See id. at 19-20 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 20. See id. at 3 (majority opinion). 
 21. See id. at 56 n.51 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); IRONS, supra note 13, at 21. 
 22. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3-5 (majority opinion). 
 23. See id. at 4. 
 24. See id. at 3, 17-18. 
 25. Id. at 28, 45 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 31-32. 
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Nevertheless, and herein lies the enduring significance of the Everson case, not 
a single Justice took issue with Black’s exposition—seemingly at odds with his 
approval of the bus-fare subsidy program—of the essential meaning of the 
Establishment Clause.27  After a lengthy historical review of the persecution 
inflicted on religious dissenters by the established churches of England and the 
American colonies, and the revulsion of the First Amendment’s framers from 
these practices, which included fines, imprisonment, torture, and even death, 
Black quoted the words of Thomas Jefferson.28  In his famous letter in 1802 to 
the Baptists of Danbury, Connecticut, who had complained about being taxed to 
support the established Congregational Church, President Jefferson replied that 
the Establishment Clause was designed to erect “a wall of separation between 
church and State.”29  “That wall,” Justice Black added, “must be kept high and 
impregnable.”30  
The most important sentence in Black’s opinion affirmed that the 
Establishment Clause “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with 
groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be 
their adversary.”31  Nor, he might have added, does it require the state to be their 
advocate.  In my opinion, applying the “neutrality” doctrine to the Ten 
Commandments displays discussed below requires either their removal from 
public places or, at the least, the adoption of formal policies that allow, on a truly 
“viewpoint-neutral” basis, the equal display of sentiments by groups such as 
humanists or (heaven forbid!) even atheists. 
C. Sticking to the Trail: The School-Prayer Cases 
The Everson decision evoked minimal public comment, either favorable or 
critical; apparently people saw little harm in subsidizing bus fares in New Jersey. 
 Fifteen years later, however, the Court touched a live wire in American society 
by striking down a longstanding and widely followed practice of beginning school 
days with the following prayer:  “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence 
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our 
                                                                                                             
 27. See id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 31-32, 46-47 (Rudledge, J., dissenting). 
 28. See id. at 8-10, 16 (majority opinion). 
 29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge et al., Comm. of the Danbury Baptist 
Ass’n of Conn. (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html; see also 
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). 
 30. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.  Today’s Religious Right activists—and historically even some 
Supreme Court Justices, see, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445-46 (1962) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting)—make much of the fact that that the words “separation of church and state” do not 
appear in the Constitution.  Although this is true, Black’s quotation from Jefferson’s letter provides 
a precedential “gloss” on the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause, especially 
considering that Everson has not been overruled and remains good law.  
 31. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added). 
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Country.”32  This prayer had been adopted in the 1950s by the New York 
Regents, who control the state’s education system.33  It would be hard to imagine 
a more innocuous prayer, but it offended Steven Engel and other parents in the 
Long Island suburb of New Hyde Park, who sued the school board and its 
president, William Vitale, alleging that the “Regents’ Prayer” violated the 
Establishment Clause.34  Ruling in 1962, the Supreme Court invalidated this daily 
religious practice in Engel v. Vitale.35  As he had in the Everson case, Justice 
Black wrote for the Court and again referenced Jefferson’s “wall of separation” 
for support.36  Black stated that the Establishment Clause “must at least mean 
that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official 
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious 
program carried on by government.”37 
Although most Jewish and mainstream Protestant leaders applauded the Engel 
ruling,38 more conservative prelates and pastors reacted with outrage.39  Cardinal 
Francis Spellman of New York professed to be “shocked and frightened,”40 while 
evangelist Billy Graham claimed that the decision marked “another step toward 
the secularization of the United States.”41  George Andrews, Alabama 
Democratic representative to the U.S. House, complained that the Court had “put 
the Negroes in the schools and now they’ve driven God out.”42  Seventy-five 
congressmen of both parties introduced bills to return prayer to classrooms 
through legislation or constitutional amendment.43 
The Supreme Court struck down another devotional ritual in 1963, banishing 
mandatory recitations of the Lord’s Prayer and Bible verses in public-school 
classrooms.44  This case began at the high school attended by Donna and Roger 
                                                                                                             
 32. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422; see also Anthony Lewis, Both Houses Get Bills to Lift Ban on 
School Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1962, at 1 (reporting on Congressional reaction to the June 
25 Engel decision); Opinion of the Week: Prayers in School, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, at 113 
[hereinafter Opinion: Prayers in School] (collecting responses to the Everson ruling from various 
public figures). 
 33. Engel, 370 U.S. at 422-23. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 425. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Lewis, supra note 32, at 20 (reporting support from the Synagogue Council of 
America and the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs). 
 39. See id. (reporting disapproval by two Catholic cardinals, a Catholic bishop, and the 
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.). 
 40. Opinion: Prayers in School, supra note 32. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Church and State, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1962, at 105. 
 43. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 30.
  44. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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Schempp in Abington Township, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Philadelphia.45  
Classes began every morning with a reading of ten verses from the Bible and 
recital of the Lord’s Prayer, as required in all schools by state law.46  The 
Schempp family belonged to the Unitarian Church, whose members reject the 
Christian Trinity and are not bound to any creed.47  Writing for the Court in 
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, Justice Tom Clark echoed 
Hugo Black: “In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly 
committed to a position of neutrality.”48  Arguments that Bible reading and 
prayer were only “minor encroachments on the First Amendment” did not convert 
Clark.49  “The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too 
soon become a raging torrent,” he replied.50 
Once again, conservative pastors and politicians decried the ruling,51 but their 
attempts to overturn it through constitutional amendment failed to gain the two-
thirds majorities needed in both houses of Congress.  I mention the critical 
reaction to the Court’s first school-prayer rulings by conservative religious and 
political leaders because these same groups—and their followers—remain 
vociferous in defending Ten Commandments displays and denounce efforts to 
remove them as attacks on God and America’s “religious heritage.” 
D. Stopping for Lemonade: A Break on the Trail 
Three decades elapsed between the Engel and Schempp rulings and the 
Supreme Court’s return to a case directly addressing school prayer.52  During this 
hiatus, the Court decided an important case that crystallized the “neutrality” 
principle from the Everson case into a three-prong judicial “test” for laws 
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds.53  In 1971, the Court struck down 
laws from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island that provided tax-funded subsidies to 
private schools—almost all Catholic—for textbooks and teacher salaries, even 
though the private schools affected ostensibly limited the use of these resources 
                                                                                                             
 45. See id. at 206. 
 46. See id. at 205-07. 
 47. See id. at 206; IRONS, supra note 13, at 30. 
 48. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226. 
 49. Id. at 225. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Billy Graham Voices Shock over Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 27; 
Congress Reacts Mildly to Ban; Some Ask Amendments to Kill It, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 
27; George Dugan, Churches Divided, With Most in Favor, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 1; Fred 
M. Hechinger, Wide Effect Due: Decision Will Require Change in Majority of State Systems, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 1963, at 1. 
 52. The Supreme Court decided Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, in 1963 and once again considered 
school prayer nearly thirty years later in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 53. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
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to “secular” instruction.54  Writing for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Chief 
Justice Warren Burger devised what became known as the Lemon test: “First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute 
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”55  Laws 
that failed any one of the three prongs of the Lemon test would be held 
unconstitutional.56  The vice of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island laws, Burger 
reasoned, was that they “entangled” state officials in deciding how much—if 
any—religious content was provided by teachers and textbooks in religious-
school classes.57  Over the years since the Lemon decision, the “entanglement” 
prong has rarely been employed, while the “purpose” and “effect” prongs have 
been applied in dozens of cases, including the Ten Commandments cases 
discussed below.58 
Thirty years after the Engel decision, and now wielding the Lemon test, the 
Supreme Court extended its ban on classroom prayers to graduation invocations, 
ruling in 1992 that clergy-delivered prayers at such events violate the 
Establishment Clause.59  The case of Lee v. Weisman involved a middle school in 
Providence, Rhode Island.60  Christian ministers had delivered sectarian prayers 
at the school’s graduations for years, but following complaints from the parents 
of a Jewish student, Deborah Weisman, school officials recruited a rabbi to offer 
the invocation, thinking that this would placate them.61 But the Weismans filed a 
suit against the prayer practice itself, and the Supreme Court, in a narrow five-to-
four decision, struck down the graduation prayers.62  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy held that the Establishment Clause “forbids the State to 
exact religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own high 
school graduation.”63  In his opinion, Kennedy utilized what became known as the 
“coercion” test, reasoning that students like Deborah Weisman felt “coerced” to 
stand with bowed heads during prayers to which they objected.64  Kennedy 
believed that this imposed a burden on teenagers who were subjected to “peer 
                                                                                                             
 54. See id. at 606-11. 
 55. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), 
and quoting Watz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). 
 56. See id.  
 57. See id. at 615. 
 58. See discussion infra Part II. 
 59. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 599 (1992). 
 60. See id. at 581. 
 61. See id.; IRONS, supra note 13, at 40-41. 
 62. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 579, 599. 
 63. Id. at 596. 
 64. See id. at 592-98. 
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pressure” to join the invocation.65  Justice Antonin Scalia responded for the 
dissenters and accused the majority of driving a judicial “bulldozer” over a 
hallowed American tradition of invoking God’s blessing on public events.66 
The Court’s most recent school-prayer ruling illustrates its steadfastness in 
sticking to precedent and principle on this divisive issue.  The case of Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe involved the practice of delivering pregame 
prayers at high-school football games.67  Santa Fe is a small Texas town, where 
the majority of people identify with the Southern Baptist denomination and where 
football games had traditionally opened with prayers delivered over the school’s 
public-address system by Baptist ministers.68  After two sets of parents—one 
Mormon and one Catholic—filed suit to enjoin this and other “proselytizing 
practices” encouraged by school officials, the school board “resolved” the 
pregame prayer issue by conducting elections in which seniors would first choose 
whether a pregame “invocation” would be given at all, and if so, which fellow 
student would deliver that “invocation.”69  The dissenting parents rejected this 
“popular choice” alternative and continued prosecuting the lawsuit in federal 
court; fearing harassment of their children, they were protected by the pseudonym 
“Doe” in the case.70 
After lower-court judges ruled against the school district, the Supreme Court 
followed suit and struck down the pregame prayers.71  Writing for the six-to-three 
majority in 2000,72 Justice John Paul Stevens dismissed the district’s claim that 
the prayers constituted “private” speech, observing that “only those messages 
deemed ‘appropriate’ under the District’s policy [could] be delivered”73 and that 
the “invocations [were] authorized by a government policy and [took] place on 
government property at government-sponsored school-related events.”74  Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist issued a sharp dissent, joined by Justices Antonin 
Scalia and Clarence Thomas, accusing the majority of distorting precedent.75   
“But even more disturbing than its holding is the tone of the Court’s opinion,” he 
wrote.76  “[I]t bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life.”77 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. at 593. 
 66. See id. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. See 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000). 
 68. See id. at 294-95; IRONS, supra note 13, at 136-39. 
 69. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 295-98. 
 70. See id. at 294, 299. 
 71. See id. at 299-301. 
 72. Id. at 293-94. 
 73. Id. at 304. 
 74. Id. at 302. 
 75. Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
10 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:1 
 
E. Straying from the Trail: Nativity Scenes, Menorahs, and “Christmas 
Clutter” 
A final pair of Establishment Clause rulings will set the stage for the Ten 
Commandments cases discussed below.  Both cases involved challenges to 
Christmas-season displays on public property.  Christmas, of course, is a holiday 
with both sacred and secular meaning.  Christians celebrate the birth of Jesus, and 
even non-Christians cannot avoid exposure to such trappings of the holiday 
season as Nativity crèches.  Such displays on private property do not offend the 
Constitution, but their placement on public property has offended some people 
enough to file lawsuits seeking their removal. 
The first challenge to Nativity displays reached the Supreme Court in 1984.78  
For some forty years, city workers in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, had erected a city-
owned crèche as part of a Christmas-season display in a downtown park.79  
Surrounding the crèche were such traditional items as candy-striped poles, a 
cutout figure of a teddy bear, a Santa’s sleigh, and a large banner that offered 
“Seasons Greetings” to all who viewed the display.80  Ruling on a suit filed by 
local ACLU members, with supporting briefs from Jewish groups, the Supreme 
Court upheld the Pawtucket display by a five-to-four margin in Lynch v. 
Donnelly.81 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger conceded that “the 
crèche is identified with one religious faith,” but he shied from banning its 
display “at the very time people are taking note of the season with Christmas 
hymns and carols in public schools and other public places.”82   Christmas, he 
implied, was so embedded in the nation’s heritage that it had become as much a 
secular as a religious holiday.83  Although Burger cited both the Everson and 
Lemon cases,84 the latter written by himself, he focused on the “context” of the 
crèche among its secular trappings in finding that “the display engender[ed] a 
friendly community spirit of goodwill” during the Christmas season.85  Writing 
for the dissenters, Justice William Brennan noted that “the crèche retains a 
specifically Christian religious meaning”86 and reminded the majority that the 
                                                                                                             
 78. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 79. Id. at 671. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 670-71. 
 82. Id. at 685-86. 
 83. See id. at 685. 
 84. See id. at 672-73. 
 85. Id. at 685, 686. 
 86. Id. at 708 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Lemon test remained “the fundamental tool of Establishment Clause analysis,”87 
arguing that the Pawtucket display violated all three prongs of the test.88 
More significant than the majority and dissenting opinions in Lynch, however, 
was the concurring opinion of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  Although she 
joined the majority to uphold the display, O’Connor wrote separately to offer a 
“clarification” of the Lemon test.89  She proposed to focus the “purpose” prong 
on “whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion” 
and the “effect” prong on “whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, 
the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or 
disapproval.”90  O’Connor put her “endorsement” test in these words:  
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in 
the political community. . . .  Endorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community.91 
Applying this test to the Pawtucket display, O’Connor reasoned that the city “did 
not intend to convey any message of endorsement of Christianity or disapproval 
of non-Christian religions” by including a Nativity scene in its holiday display.92 
The Court’s most recent foray into Christmas-season displays produced more 
shifting alignments among the Justices than coaches employ in football games. 
The primary reason for judicial discord in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, decided in 1989, was that the case involved two 
separate displays in downtown Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.93  One display, located 
in the rotunda of the county courthouse, consisted solely of an elaborate crèche 
topped by an angel holding a banner that proclaimed, “Gloria in Excelsis Deo.”94 
 The second display, outside the nearby City-County Building, featured an 
eighteen-foot Jewish menorah flanked by a forty-five-foot Christmas tree, along 
with a banner declaring the city’s “Salute to Liberty.”95 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id. at 696 n.2. 
 88. See id. at 698-704. 
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 91. Id. at 687-88. 
 92. Id. at 691. 
 93. See 492 U.S. 573, 578 (1989). 
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Ruling on the County’s appeal from Third Circuit rulings against both 
displays, the Supreme Court ordered the crèche removed but allowed the menorah 
to remain.96  The difference seemed to be the Christmas tree, and the somewhat 
less sectarian nature of the menorah,97 which is not a sacred symbol for most 
branches of Judaism.  Candy canes and teddy bears might have saved the crèche 
in Pawtucket, but the placement of one as “the single element” of the courthouse 
display in Pittsburgh made its “religious meaning unmistakably clear” to Justice 
Harry Blackmun, who wrote for the five-Justice majority in Allegheny, with 
several Justices joining one or more parts of his opinion.98  By contrast, in a 
separate opinion for six Justices, Blackmun said that the effect of “placing a 
menorah next to a Christmas tree is to create an ‘overall holiday setting’ that 
represents both Christmas and Chanukah—two holidays, not one.”99  Justice 
O’Connor again employed her “endorsement” test, which yielded different 
outcomes with regard to the crèche and the menorah.100  O’Connor joined various 
parts of Blackmun’s opinions, with three other Justices voting to strike down 
both displays and another four voting to uphold both.101  Again, “context” 
mattered for O’Connor, who seemed satisfied with what I call “Christmas clutter” 
in deciding which displays met her Establishment Clause test.102 
The eight Establishment Clause cases just discussed, which were selected from 
scores the Supreme Court has decided since 1947, have great bearing on the Ten 
Commandments cases discussed below.  First, the Court’s adoption of the 
“neutrality” principle in Everson provides, in my opinion, a touchstone for 
decisions in all religion cases, giving neither side an advantage in disputes over 
the proper role of religion in the public sphere.  Second, the school-prayer cases 
were, in a sense, “easy” for the Court to decide, since public-school students form 
a “captive audience” in classrooms and even at football games, subject to peer 
pressure to conform and official “coercion” to participate in religious activities.  
Third, the Christmas-season display cases proved more difficult to decide, and 
produced more judicial discord, because they involved a holiday with both 
religious and secular meaning and a longstanding national “heritage” of 
celebrating this holiday.  Whether permanent displays of the Ten Commandments 
in public places reflect a similar mixed “heritage” of acknowledging God, or 
instead serve the sectarian purpose of promoting obedience to his commands, 
remains a subject of continuing debate and division in American society. 
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II. “I Am the Lord Thy God”: The Court and the Commandments 
A. Inscribed in Stone: What Should Have Been—But Wasn’t—The Court’s 
Only Ten Commandments Decision 
The Supreme Court’s first Ten Commandments case, which the Court decided 
in 1980, was so “easy” for a majority of five Justices that it was decided in an 
unsigned, per curiam opinion, without benefit of briefs and oral argument.103  In 
seven paragraphs, the Court’s opinion in Stone v. Graham struck down a 
Kentucky law that mandated the posting of the Decalogue on the walls of all the 
state’s public-school classrooms.104  The statute provided that the documents 
should be paid for by private contributions, collected by the state treasurer, and 
that each copy should include, in “small print” after the last commandment, the 
following statement: “The secular application of the Ten Commandments is 
clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization 
and the Common Law of the United States.”105 
Armed with the Lemon test, the Stone majority rejected the State’s claim, set 
forth in the State’s petition for certiorari, that this addendum to the Decalogue 
copies expressed a valid secular purpose for their classroom display.  “The pre-
eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is 
plainly religious in nature,” the majority held.106  “The Ten Commandments are 
undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths,” the Court continued, 
“and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that 
fact.”107  The Decalogue’s prohibition of murder, theft, adultery, and perjury 
could not conceal its primary concern with “the religious duties of believers: 
worshipping the Lord God alone, avoiding idolatry, not using the Lord’s name in 
vain, and observing the Sabbath Day.”108  The majority concluded that the statute 
violated the “purpose” prong of the Lemon test “and thus the Establishment 
Clause of the Constitution.”109 
Chief Justice Warren Burger and three colleagues dissented from this summary 
disposal of the Stone case, but only Justice William Rehnquist issued a dissenting 
opinion.110  Rehnquist made two points in his reply to the majority. He first 
argued that the Court should defer to the “secular purpose articulated by the 
                                                                                                             
 103. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 104. See id. at 39-40. 
 105. Id. at 39 n.1, 41 (quoting KY. REV. STAT. § 158.178 (1980)). 
 106. Id. at 41. 
 107. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 108. Id. at 41-42. 
 109. Id. at 43. 
 110. See id.  
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[state] legislature” and the decision of the State’s supreme court.111  He then 
agreed with the State’s claim that “the Ten Commandments have had a 
significant impact on the development of secular legal codes of the Western 
World,” dismissing the majority’s “emphasis on the religious nature of the first 
part of the Ten Commandments [as] beside the point.”112 
The Stone case, incidentally, did not hinge on the supposed 
“impressionability” of students, as Justice Stephen Breyer mistakenly claimed in 
his Van Orden concurrence, which I will discuss below.113  In my view, Supreme 
Court Justices and lower-court judges would have been spared much time and 
effort in later Decalogue cases had they heeded and followed the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Stone case.  But some of them didn’t, thus extending this essay. 
B. A Battle of Two Cousins: The McCreary Case 
McCreary County, Kentucky, is tucked into the Cumberland Mountains in the 
state’s southeastern corner.114  It is small and poor, and its residents are 
overwhelmingly Republican in politics and Southern Baptist in religion.115  The 
county seat, Whitley City, with a population of just over one thousand, is 
dominated by the red-brick county courthouse.116  It is not the kind of place from 
which one would expect a major constitutional case to reach the Supreme Court 
and divide the Justices in their decisions. 
Nevertheless, that legal journey began on September 14, 1999, when the 
county’s elected leader, Jimmie W. Greene, posted a copy of the Ten 
Commandments on the wall of the courthouse lobby at a ceremony attended by 
American Legion members and local pastors.117  Greene, a lifelong Baptist, was 
“shocked” when he was sued by his own cousin, Louanne Walker,118  who had 
been raised in the same Baptist church.  “You know,” Walker said, “this is a 
small county, and I’d say most of the people here are in favor of having the Ten 
Commandments posted in the courthouse.”119  “I hope they realize this is not a 
statement about the Ten Commandments.  I’m not against the Ten 
Commandments.  I’m just a firm believer in separation of church and state.”120 
After the Kentucky ACLU filed suit against both McCreary County and 
neighboring Pulaski County, which had installed a similar Commandments 
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 112. Id. at 45 & n.2. 
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display in its courthouse, the case took an abrupt turn before it reached a judicial 
hearing.121  The counties’ lawyer, aware of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Stone v. 
Graham against posting the Decalogue in Kentucky schools, advised his clients 
to expand their courthouse displays to include such documents as the national 
motto of “In God We Trust,” a statement by Abraham Lincoln that “the Bible is 
the best gift God has ever given to man,” and the Mayflower Compact.122  This 
ploy, however, did not impress federal district judge Jennifer Coffman, named to 
the bench by President Bill Clinton.123  After a hearing in April 2000, she issued a 
preliminary injunction ordering county officials to remove the new displays 
immediately and not erect any similar displays in the future.124  “While a display 
of some of these documents may not have the effect of endorsing religion in 
another context,” she wrote, “they collectively have the overwhelming effect of 
endorsing religion, in the context of [these] display[s].”125  Coffman added that 
“the only unifying element among the documents is their reference to God, the 
Bible, or religion.”126 
This judicial defeat did not deter the county officials, who were determined to 
keep the Commandments in their courthouses.  Advised by a new volunteer 
lawyer, Mathew Staver of the religious conservative legal group Liberty Counsel, 
they again revised the displays to surround the Decalogue with copies of the 
Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and all four 
verses of “The Star-Spangled Banner.”127  A poster next to the exhibits identified 
the documents as “The Foundations of American Law and Government 
Display.”128  This tactic did not impress Judge Coffman, who ruled in June 2001 
that the new displays were a “sham.”129  “[P]lacing [the Decalogue] among these 
patriotic and political documents, with no other religious symbols or moral codes 
of any kind, imbues it with a national significance constituting endorsement” of 
its religious message by county officials, she wrote.130 
                                                                                                             
 121. See ACLU of Ky. v. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 691, 695 (E.D. Ky. 2000);  ACLU of 
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 125. Pulaski 96 F. Supp. 2d at 699; McCreary I, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 688. 
 126. Pulaski, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 699; McCreary I, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 688. 
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(McCreary II), 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 846-47 (E.D. Ky. 2001). 
 128. McCreary II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 846. 
 129. See id. at 848-49, 850-51. 
 130. Id. at 851; see also IRONS, supra note 13, at 192. 
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Ruling on the counties’ appeal from this decision in December 2003, a three-
judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sided with Judge 
Coffman in a split decision.131  Writing for the majority, Judge Eric Clay quoted 
from the poster that explained the “Foundations” display: “The Ten 
Commandments provide the moral background of the Declaration of 
Independence and the foundation of our legal tradition.”132  Clay found nothing in 
the displays connecting the two documents, noting that Thomas Jefferson, the 
Declaration’s primary author, did not believe in “the God of the Bible (and thus 
the Ten Commandments), but the God of deism.”133  The “patently religious 
purpose” behind the “Foundations” display, Clay concluded, violated the 
Establishment Clause.134  In a biting dissent from this ruling, Judge James Ryan 
accused his colleagues of displaying “an outright hostility to religion in our 
nation’s public life.”135  Posting the Decalogue “in the public square 
acknowledges religion, but does not endorse it,” he wrote.136 
C. The “Homeless Lawyer” and the Van Orden Case 
The counties’ petition for Supreme Court review of this adverse ruling crossed 
paths with another Ten Commandments case, this one from the Texas state 
capital of Austin.137  Home to the University of Texas and the nation’s sixteenth-
largest city, Austin is far more affluent, educated, racially and ethnically diverse, 
and politically liberal than McCreary and Pulaski counties.138  All they held in 
common was the fact that each had a Ten Commandments display that sparked 
litigation.139 
Back in 1961, Texas officials authorized the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a 
national service organization, to install a Ten Commandments monument on the 
Texas State Capitol grounds.140  This granite slab, six feet high and three-and-
one-half feet wide, is headed by the words “I AM the LORD thy God” and 
includes carved inscriptions of two Stars of David and the Greek letters Chi and 
Rho, which are common Christian shorthand symbols for “Christ.”141  Also 
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scattered around the Capitol grounds are seventeen monuments and twenty-one 
historical markers, celebrating such groups as the Texas Rangers, Confederate 
soldiers, pioneer women, and Texas cowboys.142 
More than forty years passed between the installation of the Ten 
Commandments monument and a suit demanding its removal.143  Thomas Van 
Orden filed suit in late 2001, naming Texas governor Rick Perry and other state 
officials as defendants.144  A graduate of Southern Methodist University’s law 
school and a Vietnam veteran, Van Orden had his law license suspended by the 
state bar in 1995 because he was failing to perform work for clients in his 
criminal-defense practice.145  After a divorce and suffering from depression, Van 
Orden lived in a tent, but frequented the state law library, located a few hundred 
feet from the Capitol, passing the Decalogue monument on his way.146 His 
research in the law library convinced him that the monument violated the 
Establishment Clause.147 
Dubbed the “homeless lawyer” by the media after his suit attracted 
publicity,148 Van Orden explained, “I didn’t sue the Ten Commandments. . . .  I 
didn’t sue Christianity.  I sued the state for putting a religious monument on 
Capitol grounds.  It is a message of discrimination.  Government has to remain 
neutral.”149  His case was assigned to federal district judge Harry Lee Hudspeth, 
who ruled for the State in an October 2002 opinion.150  Applying the “purpose” 
and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test, Hudspeth cited a 1961 state legislative 
resolution commending the Eagles for their “efforts to reduce juvenile 
delinquency,” supposedly the purpose for erecting the monument.151  Presumably, 
young people who viewed it would heed its admonitions to worship God and 
avoid the crimes of murder, theft, adultery, and perjury.152  The resolution, 
Hudspeth wrote, “ma[de] no reference to religion” and showed a “valid secular 
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purpose” in allowing the monument’s erection.153  Noting that the monument was 
only one of seventeen on the Capitol grounds, Hudspeth added that a “reasonable 
observer” would not “conclude that the State [was] seeking to advance, endorse 
or promote religion by permitting its display.”154 
After hitching a ride to New Orleans with a law student, Van Orden argued his 
appeal from this decision before a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.155  He knew that his chances were slim in this conservative circuit, 
remarking, “It’s like I’m appealing to the damn Southern Baptist Convention 
down there.”156  Writing for all three panel members in November 2003, Judge 
Patrick Higginbotham proved Van Orden right, upholding Hudspeth’s ruling in 
terms very similar to those used by the district judge.157  Applying the “purpose” 
and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test, as had Judge Clay in the McCreary case, 
Judge Higginbotham reached different conclusions.158  There was nothing in the 
legislative record “or the events attending the monument’s installation,” he wrote, 
“to contradict the secular reasons” for placing the Commandments monument on 
the Capitol grounds to reflect the Eagles’ “concern about juvenile 
delinquency.”159  Higginbotham reasoned that a “reasonable viewer” would look 
at the Capitol and the nearby Texas Supreme Court Building and recognize the 
monument’s message as “relevant to these law-giving instruments of State 
government.”160 
D. The Same Commandments, but Not the Same Outcome 
The Supreme Court often, but not invariably, grants review in cases that 
involve a “circuit split”—divergent rulings by federal appellate courts in cases 
that raise similar facts and legal issues—in order to resolve such conflicts and 
(hopefully) establish uniform standards to guide lower-court judges in future 
cases.161  Confronted with such a split between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in the 
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Van Orden and McCreary cases, the Court granted petitions for certiorari in both 
cases in October 2004, setting oral argument for both in March 2005.162 
The Court did not, in fact, resolve the conflicting appellate rulings in the two 
Commandments cases.  Rather, the Court’s fractured McCreary and Van Orden 
decisions not only echoed the dueling opinions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuit 
panels—with equally heated rhetoric on both sides—but also left lower-court 
judges scratching their heads in puzzlement, best illustrated in Green v. Haskell 
County Board of Commissioners discussed below.163 
Ruling on both the Kentucky and Texas cases on June 27, 2005, by separate 
majorities of five-to-four, the Court banished the Commandments from the 
McCreary and Pulaski county courthouses, but allowed the Decalogue monument 
to remain standing on the Capitol grounds in Austin.164  Writing for the majority 
in McCreary, Justice David Souter—joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra Day O’Connor—looked to past 
cases, beginning with Everson in 1947, that collectively “mandate[d] 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”165  That principle is violated “when the government’s ostensible 
object is to take sides,” Souter wrote.166  It was clear to him that the counties had 
taken sides by initially posting, by itself, a religious text that rested its commands 
“on the sanction of the divinity proclaimed at the beginning of the text.”167 
It was also clear to Souter that subsequent displays of more secular documents 
did not erase the clearly religious purpose of the first,168 which exhibited “an 
unmistakably religious statement dealing with religious obligations and with 
morality subject to religious sanction.”169  Souter dismissed the revised displays 
as a “litigating position” adopted by county officials who “were simply reaching 
for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses 
constitutionally required to embody religious neutrality.”170  Rhetorically clearing 
his throat, Souter concluded that “[n]o reasonable observer could swallow the 
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claim that the Counties had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier 
displays.”171  In other words, in this case, no amount of camouflage could hide the 
sectarian message of the Ten Commandments. 
In a separate concurrence, Justice O’Connor dusted off her “endorsement” test, 
adding a few pointed words.  “It is true that many Americans find the 
Commandments in accord with their personal beliefs,” she wrote,172 tacitly 
acknowledging the overwhelming public support for their display in public 
places.173  “But we do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment,” 
she added.174  The Constitution’s religion clauses, she concluded, “protect 
adherents of all religions, as well as those who believe in no religion at all.”175 
Writing for the four dissenters in McCreary—including Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas—Justice 
Antonin Scalia denounced as “demonstrably false [the] principle that the 
government cannot favor religion over irreligion.”176  Scalia expressed his view 
that the Establishment Clause allows “disregard of polytheists and believers in 
unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists,” and later 
noted the “overwhelming majority of religious believers” who support religious 
practices and symbols in public places.177  Scalia unabashedly counted heads and 
found a majority on the side of the Decalogue.178  
Obviously, the Supreme Court also counts heads when its members vote on 
cases.  The majority coalition in McCreary shifted to the other side in the Van 
Orden case, with Justice Breyer jumping over the “wall of separation” to cast the 
deciding vote to support the Texas monument, although he did not join the 
plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist.179  Rehnquist’s opinion was brief 
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but heated and was joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.180  The 
Chief Justice conceded the “religious significance” of the Decalogue but rejected 
the premise that such significance should prohibit its public display.181  
“[A]cknowledgments of the role played by the Ten Commandments in our 
Nation’s heritage are common throughout America,” he wrote.182  “We need only 
look within our own Courtroom,” Rehnquist stated, referring to a depiction of 
Moses holding tablets (inscribed in Hebrew) in a frieze that includes other 
historic law-givers.183  “Simply having religious content or promoting a message 
consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause,” Rehnquist concluded.184 
III. Straddling the “Wall of Separation,” with No Place to Stand 
A. “Context and Consequences”—A Critical Dissection of Justice Breyer’s 
Van Orden Concurrence 
This essay would probably not have been written, and (more importantly) 
much subsequent litigation would have been avoided, had Justice Stephen Breyer 
not switched sides in the McCreary and Van Orden cases, joining the majority in 
the former and casting, through his concurring opinion, the decisive vote in the 
latter.185  This switch raises an important and intriguing question: why did Breyer 
switch sides in these cases?  A careful reading of his Van Orden concurrence 
(which I urge readers of this essay to do for themselves) reveals, at least to me, 
both the pretextual nature of his arguments in that opinion and the actual reason 
for his decision to uphold the Decalogue monument on the Texas State Capitol 
grounds. 
In his Van Orden concurrence, Breyer conceded that this was a “difficult, 
borderline case.”186  Looking for factors to distinguish it from McCreary, he 
found three that influenced his decision: context, secular purpose, and lack of 
divisiveness over time.   
Five times in his concurrence, Breyer emphasized the importance of the 
“context” of the Texas monument.187  Unlike the Kentucky display, in which the 
Ten Commandments initially stood alone on the courthouse wall and became 
                                                                                                             
judgment). 
 180. See id. at 680 (plurality opinion). 
 181. Id. at 690. 
 182. Id. at 688. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 849 (2005); Van Orden, 545 U.S. 
at 680, 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 186. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J. concurring in the judgment). 
 187. Id. at 701-02. 
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surrounded only in later displays,188 the Texas monolith was set aside “in a large 
park” that contained nearly forty other monuments and historical markers, none 
with religious meaning.189  For Breyer, this “physical setting” provided “a strong, 
but not conclusive, indication that the Commandments’ text on this monument 
conveys a predominantly secular message” in a “context of history and moral 
ideas.”190   
A second weakness in Breyer’s concurrence stems from his repeated reference 
to the supposedly “secular” nature of the Ten Commandments.191  In fact, he 
contradicted himself in making this argument, since he had joined the McCreary 
opinion of Justice Souter, who labeled the Decalogue “an unmistakably religious 
statement dealing with religious obligations and with morality subject to religious 
sanction.”192  Nonetheless, Breyer claimed in his Van Orden concurrence that the 
Decalogue “can convey . . . a secular moral message” concerning “proper 
standards of social conduct” and “a historic relation between those standards and 
the law.”193 
A final distinguishing factor between the Kentucky and Texas cases lies in 
Justice Breyer’s repeated references in his Van Orden concurrence to the 
supposed community “divisiveness” or “social conflict” engendered by 
McCreary and lacking in Van Orden.194   Citing the fact that forty years had 
passed between the Texas monument’s installation and Thomas Van Orden’s 
challenge to it as evidence that it was “unlikely to prove divisive” in Austin 
(although perhaps not elsewhere in Texas), Breyer revealed in his concurrence his 
real fear that the monument’s removal “might well encourage disputes concerning 
the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public 
buildings across the Nation.  And it could thereby create the very kind of 
                                                                                                             
 188. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850; see also supra text accompanying notes 117-30. 
 189. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 190. Id.  In fairness, it is difficult to fault Justice Breyer for this emphasis on the physical setting 
and “context” of the Texas monument, since that factor provided the basis for the Court’s decisions 
on the Nativity-scene and menorah displays in the Lynch and Allegheny cases. See County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984); see also discussion supra Part I.E.  
 191. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that 
“[i]n certain contexts, a display of . . . the Ten Commandments can convey . . . a secular moral 
message.”). 
 192. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869; see also supra text accompanying note 169. 
 193. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).  I will discuss below 
the falsity of the supposed linkage between the religious and secular provisions of the 
Commandments as “a source of American law.”  See discussion infra Part III.B.  Suffice it to note 
here that Breyer, in my view, was simply grasping at straws in trying to conflate these differing 
components to justify the Decalogue’s display in Texas.  
 194. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”195  
But if past and potential “divisiveness” were a proper factor in judicial decisions, 
the Supreme Court might not have rendered its Brown v. Board of Education196 
and Roe v. Wade197 decisions, striking down school segregation and 
constitutionalizing abortion rights, respectively.  In my view, by raising the 
“divisiveness” issue, Breyer was recoiling from the (probably unfounded) 
prospect of backhoes and cranes ripping out dozens of Ten Commandments 
monuments, provoking scenes of resistance by their supporters.   In any event, 
such fears should not deter judges from performing their duties in construing the 
Constitution. 
B. Are the Ten Commandments A Source of American Law?    
In his Van Orden concurrence, Justice Breyer buttressed his claim that display 
of the Ten Commandments at the Texas State Capitol conveyed a “predominantly 
secular message” with the assertion that the “proper standards of social conduct” 
contained in the Decalogue reflect the “historic relation between those standards 
and the law.”198  Similar statements have been made in the writings and legal 
briefs of the Decalogue’s defenders, including the Van Orden amicus brief of the 
United States, which Breyer cited,199 asserting that “historians” have supported 
the view “that the Ten Commandments influenced the development of American 
law.”200  However, neither Breyer nor the Justice Department brief named a single 
historian or cited any scholarly publication to support these assertions.201  In fact, 
every reputable historian of American law (including professed Christians) has 
                                                                                                             
 195. Id. at 704.  Though McCreary involved a display of more recent vintage, it illustrates the 
kind of “divisiveness” Justice Breyer apparently feared—though even that case failed to inspire the 
kind of acrimony witnessed in conjunction with other Commandments cases.  IRONS, supra note 
13, at 187.  Still, faced with a lawsuit asking for the removal of the Ten Commandments from the 
McCreary County courthouse, Jimmie Greene had vowed, “I’m not going to take them down.  It’s 
going to take the big man in the black robe to tell me to take them down.”  Id.  But when the men 
and women of the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ orders for their removal, Greene 
surrendered his battle to put the Commandments back in the courthouse.  See id. at 211. 
 196. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 197. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 198. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701-02 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19-20, Van 
Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (No. 03-1500), 2005 WL 263790, at *19-20 [hereinafter Amicus Brief for 
the United States], available at http://www.lc.org/ten/briefs.htm.  This Liberty Counsel website 
includes links to all the Supreme Court documents in both the McCreary and Van Orden cases, 
including certiorari petitions, replies, briefs of parties and amicus groups, oral argument transcripts, 
and opinions. 
 201. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698-705 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Amicus 
Brief for the United States, supra note 200, at 7-8. 
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rejected the idea that the Commandments provided any historical foundation for 
American law.202 
The claim that the Commandments have provided a source of American law is 
simply false.  This is not an insignificant or tangential issue in debates over the 
constitutionality of Decalogue displays.  In every case decided thus far, the 
supposed “nexus between the Commandments and American law,” to quote the 
Justice Department’s brief in Van Orden, has been argued by their supporters.203 
 For example, as noted above, the “small print” at the bottom of the Kentucky 
classroom displays of the Commandments considered in Stone v. Graham made 
this statement: “The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly 
seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the 
Common Law of the United States.”204  Similarly, the governing bodies of 
McCreary and Pulaski counties adopted identical resolutions stating that the 
Commandments were “codified in Kentucky’s civil and criminal laws.”205  The 
Supreme Court brief of the McCreary defendants asserted that the Supreme 
Court “has recognized the influence the Ten Commandments has had on our 
system of law and government.”206  For authority, the brief cited the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Stone v. Graham, as well as various other 
dissenting and concurring opinions—hardly dealing from a strong hand.207 
If the Ten Commandments were, in fact, a source of American law, the burden 
should rest upon supporters of their public display to produce some evidence of 
this purported linkage.  They have produced none beyond mere assertion.  To the 
contrary, every reputable historian of American law has disputed any such 
linkage.  Of course, the first, and best, place to look for such evidence is in the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787.  As a historian, I have read 
every word of the accounts of that convention, which resulted in a Constitution 
that is “the supreme Law of the Land.”208  There is not one mention of the Ten 
Commandments, or of the Bible, anywhere in James Madison’s almost verbatim 
notes of the convention’s debates.209 
                                                                                                             
 202. See infra notes 214-24 and accompanying text. 
 203. Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 200, at 20. 
 204. 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (quoting KY. REV. STAT. § 158.178 (1980)); see also supra text 
accompanying note 105. 
 205. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 853 (2005). 
 206. Brief for Petitioners at 21, McCreary, 545 U.S. 844  (No. 03-1693), 2004 WL 2851009, 
at *21. 
 207. See id. at 21 n.21.  
 208. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 209. See generally JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
(bicentennial ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1966); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Legal 
Historians and Law Scholars on Behalf of Respondents at 20, McCreary, 545 U.S. 844 (No. 03-
1693), 2005 WL 166586, at *20 [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Legal Historians]. 
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Nor is there any mention of the Commandments in the (admittedly much more 
fragmentary) reports of the state ratifying conventions, or in the Federalist 
Papers.210  To be sure, some of the laws in the American colonies were based on 
biblical precepts, such as laws in the Massachusetts Bay Colony that punished 
such crimes as idolatry, blasphemy, and witchcraft with death penalties.211  But 
such laws, even those that stayed on the books after the Constitution was ratified, 
have no legal force today.  And the crimes of murder, adultery, theft, and perjury, 
forbidden by the Commandments, have more ancient roots than the Bible, 
stemming back to the Code of Hammurabi from the sixteenth century B.C. and 
the pre-biblical laws of ancient Greece and Rome.212  These prohibitions have 
been a part of “virtually every culture” in the world.213 
Other legal historians agree with me on these issues.  Marci Hamilton of 
Cardozo Law School has written extensively on this issue, positioning herself as 
“a Christian, an American, and a scholar.”214  She dismisses the argument that the 
Commandments form “the ground for much of our criminal law, and therefore 
constitute a legal and historical document—not a religious one” as “so weak it 
ought to be rejected out of hand.”215  Hamilton notes that the first four 
Commandments, as well as the admonitions to honor one’s parents and not to 
covet one’s neighbor’s goods or wife, “simply cannot be enacted into law.”216  In 
addition, a criminal prohibition against adultery, (as opposed to provisions 
designating the act as grounds for divorce in many states) “would likely be struck 
down as unconstitutional” by today’s Supreme Court.217  That leaves only 
murder, theft, and perjury, which were crimes in most societies long before the 
Bible was written.218 
Another noted legal historian, Paul Finkelman of Albany Law School, notes 
that it is even difficult to decide which of the several versions of the 
                                                                                                             
 210. See Amicus Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 209, at 21 (citing JAMES MADISON ET 
AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (1788)). 
 211. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 2-7. 
 212. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION 55 (1997). 
 213. Amicus Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 209, at 10 n.17. 
 214. See Marci Hamilton, The Ten Commandments and American Law: Why Some Christians’ 
Claims to Legal Hegemony Are Not Consistent with the Historical Record, FINDLAW, Sept. 11, 
2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030911.html. 
 215. Marci Hamilton, The Ten Commandments in Court: Power and Its Abuse, FINDLAW, Mar. 
14, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20020314.html. 
 216. Hamilton, supra note 214. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. (observing that “the Ten Commandments echo some of the rules that appear in 
Hammurabi’s Code,” which was written “roughly one thousand years [before] the Ten 
Commandments appeared”).
 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
26 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:1 
 
Commandments is accurate, and that Catholics, Protestants and Jews have 
competing lists.219  He concludes that  
[m]onuments to the Ten Commandments . . . do not reflect an 
objective or accurate representation of the historical development of 
American law.  Rarely have American lawmakers turned to the 
Commandments for guidance. . . .  Rather than reflecting our legal 
heritage, to a great extent the Ten Commandments fly in the face of 
the evolution of American law, which has been towards secular 
freedoms and liberties and towards greater religious diversity. . . . 
Thus, there is no historical foundation for a claim that a monument or 
a plaque to the Ten Commandments, such as the ones at issue in the 
Kentucky and Texas cases, are rooted in our legal and political 
history.220   
Finkelman agrees with Marci Hamilton that “[m]ost of the Commandments . . . 
could not be enacted into law and withstand a constitutional challenge.”221 
Steven K. Green of Willamette University Law School, who wrote his Ph.D. 
history dissertation on this topic, prepared an amicus brief in McCreary that was 
signed by twenty-seven noted legal historians, a veritable “who’s who” of the 
field.222  After an exhaustive review of all the available influences on the drafting 
of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the brief notes that “the 
Ten Commandments and biblical law received nary a mention in the debates and 
publications surrounding the founding documents.”223  The brief’s signers agreed 
that “the foundation of the law of the United States thus emanates from the nature 
of representative government—what Jefferson called ‘the consent of the 
governed’—and needs no external or divine authority for its support.”224  I could 
easily list and quote from more scholars on this issue, but I think I have made my 
point. 
Hardly anyone disputes that most of the Constitution’s drafters were 
Christians of various stripes, largely of heterodox views.  But none, with the 
possible exception of James Wilson of Pennsylvania, subscribed to the biblical 
inerrancy doctrine of today’s Religious Right activists.  This leads me to wonder 
                                                                                                             
 219. Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1488-92 (2005).  Finkelman notes that the Bible lists “at least thirteen 
separate admonitions” in the “ten” commandments.  Id. at 1488.    
 220. Id. at 1517. 
 221. Id. at 1518. 
 222. See Amicus Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 209, at app. A. 
 223. Id. at 20. 
 224. Id. 
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why Justice Breyer cited the unsupported and conclusory Justice Department 
brief in his Van Orden concurrence,225 while apparently ignoring the well-
supported brief of the nation’s leading constitutional and legal historians.  My 
own suspicion is that Breyer wanted to avoid the “social conflict” that he feared 
would follow a decision to remove the Decalogue monument from the Texas 
State Capitol grounds and simply closed his eyes to the relevant evidence in the 
case.226 
IV. Which Side of the Border?  Ten Commandments Cases After Van Orden 
A. Justice Breyer Splits the Circuits 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Van Orden has created the unfortunate but 
easily foreseeable consequence of forcing lower-court judges to confront a 
difficult and “fact-intensive” question in deciding pending and future Ten 
Commandments cases: is this case more like McCreary or more like Van 
Orden?227  This inquiry requires judges to examine a host of subsidiary 
questions.  Was the display located inside or outside of a public building, or in a 
distant park?  Was it standing alone or surrounded by other documents or 
monuments?  Was it erected decades ago or recently?  Was it initiated by public 
officials or private citizens?  Was it paid for or maintained by public or private 
funds?  Was its erection accompanied by religious comments from public 
officials, clergy members, or private citizens?  How much time elapsed between 
its erection and a lawsuit challenging the display?  In answering these questions, 
and deciding on which side of Breyer’s “borderline” the answers fell, judges are 
literally compelled to use a tally sheet, ticking off which factors carry the most 
weight in reaching their decisions. 
It is hardly surprising that federal appellate courts, given the conflicting 
decisions in McCreary and Van Orden, and the divergent political and social 
views among their judges, would inevitably reach different conclusions and a 
second and similar circuit split would form after the 2005 Supreme Court 
decisions.228  Whether the Justices will step into this jurisprudential mine field 
                                                                                                             
 225. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 226. See id. at 699.  
 227. Breyer seems to have foreseen these difficulties himself, emphasizing that in any 
“borderline” case regarding a public display of the Ten Commandments, an inquiry into the factual 
context of the display is required.  See id. at 700-01. 
 228. Compare Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(holding Decalogue display on an Oklahoma county courthouse lawn unconstitutional), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010), with Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding a Fraternal Order of Eagles Decalogue display on the lawn of the former city hall 
constitutional), and ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005) (en 
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once again remains to be seen at this writing.229  We begin by examining two 
recent cases from Nebraska and Washington state. 
B. The Eagles Monument in Plattsmouth, Nebraska 
Plattsmouth is a town of approximately 7000 residents in eastern Nebraska, 
across the Mississippi River from Iowa.230  Back in 1965, the local Fraternal 
Order of Eagles donated a Ten Commandments monument to the town, which 
placed it in a forty-five-acre park some ten blocks from city hall.231  Like the 
similar monument outside the Texas State Capitol, it was inscribed with two 
Stars of David and the Greek letters Chi and Rho to signify Christ.232  There are 
apparently no surviving records of the town’s decision to accept the monument or 
of remarks made at its installation.233  Thirty-six years passed before a town 
resident, known as “John Doe” in court papers, filed suit in 2001 to seek its 
removal, with the Nebraska ACLU as the lead plaintiff.234 
After a federal district judge ruled for “Doe” and the ACLU, holding that the 
monument violated the Establishment Clause,235 a divided panel of the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.236  The City was later able, 
however, to secure en banc review by all thirteen circuit judges, who reversed the 
panel with only two dissenters in 2005,237 holding that “Van Orden governs our 
resolution of this case.”238  Citing Justice Breyer’s concurrence in that case, the 
majority found that the monument’s location in a park, the time that had elapsed 
before it was challenged, and its donation by a private group combined to allow 
the “use of the text of the Ten Commandments to acknowledge the role of 
religion in our Nation’s heritage.”239  The two dissenters viewed the Decalogue as 
                                                                                                             
banc) (holding another Fraternal Order of Eagles Decalogue display in the city park constitutional). 
 229. Though the Court denied the county’s petition for certiorari in Green, see 130 S. Ct. 1687, 
Liberty Counsel has filed a certiorari petition asking the Court to review the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, 
on remand from the Court’s 2005 McCreary decision, to uphold Judge Coffman’s grant of a 
permanent injunction, see ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary County, 607 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2010), 
petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3286 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2010) (No. 10-566).   
 230. See COMMUNITY FACTS PLATTSMOUTH, NEBRASKA (2008), available at 
http://sites.nppd.com/aedc/FactsBook/Plattsmouthbook.pdf.    
 231. See Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d at 773-74. 
 232. See id. at 773. 
 233. See id. at 774 (noting that some city officials were involved in the monument’s installation, 
though it is not known whether they were acting in their official capacities). 
 234. See id. at 773-74. 
 235. ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (D. Neb. 2002), aff’d, 
358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), rev’d en banc, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 236. See 358 F.3d at 1042, 1050. 
 237. See 419 F.3d at 773, 778. 
 238. Id. at 776. 
 239. See id. at 776-78. 
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“a command from the Judeo-Christian God on how he requires his followers to 
live.”240  Labeling the Commandments as simply “an ‘acknowledgement of the 
role of religion’ diminishes their sanctity to believers and belies the words 
themselves,” the dissenters wrote, in an apparent reference to the commandment 
against “graven images.”241 
C. Another Eagles Monument in Everett, Washington 
Everett, Washington, is a waterfront city north of Seattle whose more than 
100,000 residents mostly work in the technology, aerospace, and service 
industries.242  In 1959, the Eagles donated a Ten Commandments monument to 
the city, inscribed like those in Plattsmouth and Austin with two Stars of David 
and the Chi and Rho symbols of Christ.243  City officials originally installed it in 
front of the city hall (now “Old City Hall”) in a ceremony attended by civic 
leaders and church leaders, who, according to a contemporaneous announcement 
in a local paper, were slated to offer an invocation and benediction.244  
After a local resident, Jesse Card, filed suit against the City in 2003, aided by 
volunteer lawyers from prestigious firms in Seattle and Washington, D.C., a 
federal district judge ruled for the City in 2005.245  Ruling in March 2008, a 
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously upheld this 
decision.246  The lengthy opinion reviewed the McCreary and Van Orden cases, 
focusing on Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the latter.247  Citing such factors as 
the monument’s private donor, the years that had elapsed before Jesse Card filed 
suit, and the presence of other—although later-added—monuments around it, the 
appellate panel found, as Breyer had in Van Orden, that the Everett monument 
conveyed both “a secular moral message” and “a historical message.”248  
Dismissing McCreary as factually dissimilar, and looking to the “context” of the 
monument’s history and surroundings, the panel found it “clear that Van Orden 
control[led the] decision.”249 
                                                                                                             
 240. Id. at 781 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
 241. See id. 
 242. Everett Washington USA, About Everett, http://www.everettwa.org/default.aspx? ID=314 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
 243. Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 244. See id. at 1010-12.  In 1988, the City moved the monument a few feet from its original 
location to make room for a war memorial, and it is now flanked by several other historical and 
patriotic monuments and markers.  See id. at 1011. 
 245. See Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1172, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2005), aff’d, 
520 F.3d 1009. 
 246. Card, 520 F.3d at 1010, 1021. 
 247. See id. at 1017-21. 
 248. See id. at 1019-21. 
 249. Id. at 1021. 
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Viewed in tandem, the Plattsmouth and Card cases, with their primary focus 
on the factors that Breyer found “determinative” in his Van Orden 
concurrence,250 established what I would describe—and not entirely facetiously—
as the “Breyer test.”  Under this test, if a Decalogue display is old, donated by a 
civic group like the Eagles, and unchallenged for decades, it passes constitutional 
muster.  But what if the display is new, donated by someone with clearly religious 
motives, and promptly challenged by a lawsuit?  Does that make a challenge to 
the display a McCreary case, governed by these factors?  What if a Ten 
Commandments case involves some factors in Van Orden and some from 
McCreary?  These questions illustrate the dilemma faced by judges who are 
called upon to resolve the conflicts posed in Decalogue cases. 
V. “The Lord Had Burdened [My] Heart”—The Green v. Haskell County 
Case 
A. “I’m a Christian and I Believe in This” 
Haskell County, Oklahoma, has much in common with McCreary County, 
Kentucky.  Both are small in population, with roughly 15,000 residents in each, 
and poor; the median income in both counties is significantly less than the 
national average.251  The 2000 census figures show that education levels in both 
lag well behind other counties in their respective states and the rest of the 
nation.252  Neither county is closer than sixty miles to a major city.  Both are 
conservative in politics; approximately seventy percent of the voters in each 
backed John McCain over Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election.253  
                                                                                                             
 250. See id. at 1010; ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 776, 778 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 251. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Haskell County, Oklahoma, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/40/40061.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) [hereinafter 
Haskell Facts] (estimating Haskell County’s population in 2009 at 12,393 and its 2008 median 
household income at $34,327), and U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: McCreary 
County, Kentucky, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21147.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) 
[hereinafter McCreary Facts] (estimating McCreary County’s population in 2009 at 17,795 and its 
2008 median household income at $22,253), with CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 
5 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf (estimating the national 
median household income in 2008 at $50,303). 
 252. Compare Haskell Facts, supra note 251 (pegging the percent of high-school graduates 
among persons age twenty-five and older at 66.9% in Haskell County, relative to 80.6% in 
Oklahoma generally), and McCreary Facts, supra note 251 (placing the high school graduation rate 
at 52.6% in McCreary County, compared to 74.1% in Kentucky generally), with State & County 
QuickFacts, USA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) 
(showing the national high school graduation rate in 2000 to be 80.4%). 
 253. See N.Y. Times, Election Results 2008, Oklahoma: Presidential County Results (Dec. 9, 
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Lastly, both are fundamentalist in religion, with Baptists laying claim to an 
overwhelming majority of adherents in each county in 2000.254  Considering the 
similarities between the two counties, it is not surprising that Ten 
Commandments displays were installed in both, with local residents expressing 
surprise and dismay that anyone would file a lawsuit to remove this symbol of the 
Christian faith.255 
The Ten Commandments display in Haskell County was erected in 2004 by 
Mike Bush, a Southern Baptist lay minister who made his living as a construction 
worker.256  Bush told the county’s three-member Board of Commissioners that 
“the Lord had burdened [his] heart” to install a Decalogue monument on the 
courthouse lawn in Stigler, the county seat and a town of some 2500 people.257  
According to the recorded minutes of this meeting, “[t]he Board agreed that Mike 
could go ahead and have the monument made and Mike is taking care of all the 
expense.”258  Before the installation, but apparently without the commissioners’ 
knowledge or approval, Bush decided to have inscribed on the other side of the 
monument the text of the Mayflower Compact, signed by the Plymouth Colony 
settlers in 1620, and proclaiming, among other things, their devotion to “the glory 
of God, and advancement of the Christian faith.”259 
The Haskell County monument was dedicated on November 7, 2004, at a 
ceremony attended by more than 100 people, including two of the three 
                                                                                                             
2008), http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/results/states/president/oklahoma.html (showing that 69% 
of Haskell County voters voted for McCain); N.Y Times Election Results 2008, Kentucky: 
Presidential County Results (Dec. 9, 2008), http://elections.nytimes.com/ 
2008/results/states/preident/kentucky.html [hereinafter Kentucky: Presidential County Results] 
(showing that 75% of McCreary County voters voted for McCain). 
 254. See The Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), County Membership Report: 
Haskell County, Oklahoma (2000) [hereinafter ARDA Haskell County Membership Report], 
http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/reports/counties/40061_2000_Rate.asp; ARDA, County 
Membership Report: McCreary County, Kentucky (2000), http://www.thearda.com 
/mapsReports/reports/counties/21147_2000.asp.     
 255. See IRONS, supra note 13, at 186.  I mention the similarities between these counties, not to 
denigrate their residents (and similar small towns and rural communities), but to stress that their 
religious, racial, cultural, and political homogeneity, coupled with their geographic insularity and 
isolation, distinguish them from larger cities and urban areas, where greater diversity in these factors 
arguably engenders a corresponding tolerance of minorities and dissenters. 
  As an aside, calling the Decalogue a “Judeo-Christian” symbol is misleading; although the 
Commandments come from the Hebrew scriptures, no Jews, to my knowledge, have initiated their 
display in public places, and most Jewish groups oppose such displays.   
 256. See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).  
 257. See id. at 788, 790 (alteration in original). 
 258. Id. at 790. 
 259. See id. at 789-90. 
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commissioners and representatives of seventeen churches.260  That same month, 
one commissioner told a reporter, referring to the monument, “That’s what we’re 
trying to live by, that right there. . . .  I’m a Christian and I believe in this. I think 
it’s a benefit to the community.”261 
One person who did not think that the monument benefitted Haskell County 
was a Stigler resident, James W. Green, who filed a suit against the Board of 
Commissioners in October 2005, aided by the Oklahoma ACLU and one of its 
volunteer lawyers, Micheal Salem of Norman.262  In response, Mike Bush 
organized a “Support the Ten Commandments Monument” rally at the 
courthouse the month after Green filed his suit.263  Attended by over three 
hundred people, the rally featured local pastors and U.S. Senator Tom Coburn,264 
a far-right Republican, who said, “I wish this was in every courthouse on the lawn 
. . . .  We need more of this, not less.”265  Mike Bush reported that over 2800 
signatures had been collected on a petition supporting the monument.266  “My 
heart is thankful to see so many people coming out,” he said.267  “All our laws are 
based on the 10 laws up here on our courthouse lawn.”268  One of the county 
commissioners stirred the crowd with a defiant pledge: “I’ll stand up in front of 
that monument and if you bring a bulldozer up here you’ll have to push me down 
with it,”269 a pretty clear indication of the “divisiveness” the Supreme Court had 
identified in McCreary and that Justice Breyer sought to avoid in the Van Orden 
case.270 
Jim Green’s suit came before federal district judge Ronald A. White, named to 
the bench by President George W. Bush.271  Sitting in nearby Muskogee, seat of 
the federal Eastern District of Oklahoma, White conducted a two-day bench trial 
                                                                                                             
 260. See id. at 791. 
 261. Id. at 792. 
 262. See Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Haskell, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 
1274, 1279 (E.D. Okla. 2006), rev’d, 568 F.3d 784. 
 263. See Green, 568 F.3d at 792. 
 264. Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1280. 
 265. Coburn Attends Ten Commandments Monument Rally, FOX NEWS, Nov. 20, 2005, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,176158,00.html. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 792 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010). 
 270. See discussion supra Parts II.D & III.A. 
 271. See Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Haskell, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 
1274 (E.D. Okla. 2006), rev’d, 568 F.3d 784; Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of 
Federal Judges, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj [hereinafter FJC Directory] (select “W” 
hyperlink from alphabetical list; then follow “White, Ronald A.” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 3, 
2010). 
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in May 2006.272  Mike Salem appeared for Green; opposing him, and 
representing Haskell County, was Kevin Theriot, a staff lawyer in Kansas for the 
Arizona-based Alliance Defense Fund,273 a Religious Right legal group whose 
stated mission is to promote “the spread of the Gospel through the legal defense 
of religious freedom”274 and that affirms the Bible as “the inspired, infallible, 
authoritative Word of God.”275 
Ruling on August 18, 2006, Judge White relied on Van Orden in holding that 
the Haskell County monument “did not overstep the constitutional line 
demarcating government neutrality toward religion.”276  He noted that the 
courthouse lawn featured several other monuments, including those honoring war 
veterans and recognizing the Choctaw Indians.277   “A reasonable observer would 
see that the [Decalogue] Monument is not the focus of the courthouse lawn,” 
White wrote, adding, “The mélange of monuments surrounding the one at issue 
here obviously detract from any religious message that may be conveyed by the 
Commandments.”278  Revealing his personal view that the Green case was hardly 
worth his time, White dubbed it a “kerfuffle,” implying in effect that it was much 
ado about nothing.279 
B. “The Religious Message of the Monument” 
Jim Green’s appeal from Judge White’s ruling was filed in the U. S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in September 2006.280  Almost three years passed 
before a three-judge panel issued its unanimous opinion on June 8, 2009.281  
Writing for the panel, Judge Jerome Holmes reversed Judge White’s ruling, 
finding this case more like McCreary than Van Orden.282  Holmes focused on the 
facts that the Haskell County monument had been recently installed, that Green 
                                                                                                             
 272. See Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1274. 
 273. See id. 
 274. Alliance Defense Fund, About the Alliance Defense Fund,  
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/About [hereinafter About ADF] (last visited Oct. 3, 2010). 
 275. Id. (follow “ADF Statement of Faith & Guiding Principles” hyperlink). 
  276. See Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-91, 1296-97. 
 277. See id. at 1274-75.  Native Americans make up roughly fifteen percent of the county’s 
residents.  Haskell Facts, supra note 251. 
 278. Green, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. 
 279. Id. at 1274. 
 280. 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, appeal docketed, No. 06-7098 (10th Cir. Sept. 20, 2006). 
 281. See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010).  All of the members of the panel were named to the bench by 
President George W. Bush and hardly represent the kind of liberal “activist” judges that 
conservatives excoriate.  See FJC Directory, supra note 271 (select “H” and “O” hyperlinks from 
alphabetical list; then follow “Hartz, Harris L.,” “Holmes, Jerome A.,” and “O’Brien, Terrence L.” 
hyperlinks). 
 282. See Green, 568 F.3d at 807-09. 
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had filed suit within a year of its erection, and that county commissioners had 
supported the monument with religious comments.283  Any “reasonable observer” 
of the monument, Holmes wrote, “would have been left with the clear 
impression—not counteracted by the individual commissioners or the Board 
collectively—that the commissioners were speaking on behalf of the government 
and the government was endorsing the religious message of the Monument.”284  
On this point, after quoting the commissioners’ religious comments made in 
support of the monument, Holmes noted that “[i]n a small community like 
Haskell County, where everyone knows everyone,” such statements of opinion 
would be perceived as government speech.285  Indeed, one commissioner 
described his post as a “24 hours a day, 7 days a week” job.286  In this regard, 
Haskell County more resembled McCreary County, Kentucky, than Austin, 
Texas. 
After this judicial setback, Kevin Theriot asked the Tenth Circuit for an en 
banc review of the panel’s decision by the full bench of twelve active judges.287 
Ruling on July 30, 2009, the judges denied the request by a six-to-six vote.288  All 
six judges who voted to rehear the case had been named to the bench by 
Republican presidents.289  Between them, the six dissenters issued two lengthy 
opinions, while the six judges favoring denial of review remained silent, as is 
normal in voting against en banc review.290  In both opinions, the dissenters 
castigated the panel for finding the Green case more like McCreary than Van 
Orden.291 
Writing for himself and three colleagues, Judge Neil Gorsuch called the panel 
decision “simply inconsistent with the most analogous decision of the Supreme 
Court.”292  The most important factors to Gorsuch were the secular monuments 
that surrounded the Ten Commandments on the courthouse lawn, which he felt 
diminished the Decalogue’s religious message, and the monument’s donation by a 
                                                                                                             
 283. See id. at 801-02, 807. 
 284. See id. at 803. 
 285. See id. 
 286. Id. at 801. 
 287. See Green v. Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs, 574 F.3d 1235, 1235 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(denying Defendants-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc). 
 288. See id.  A majority is required to grant en banc review.  FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
 289. FJC Directory, supra note 271 (select “H,” “K,” “M,”  “O,” and “T” hyperlinks from 
alphabetical list; then follow “Hartz, Harris L.,” “Holmes, Jerome A.,” “Kelly, Paul Joseph Jr.,” 
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 292. See id. at 1249 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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private citizen, Mike Bush.293  Admitting that the conflicting decisions in 
McCreary and Van Orden were difficult to reconcile and apply, Gorsuch 
maintained, “[W]e should all be able to agree at least that cases like Van Orden 
should come out like Van Orden.”294 
In an opinion joined by two colleagues, Judge Paul Kelly noted the inscription 
on the monument, “Erected by Citizens of Haskell County,” and also cited the 
“context” of nearby monuments, concluding that these factors left “little doubt 
that the government itself did not communicate a predominantly religious 
message, but rather was merely providing space for yet another donated 
monument related to Haskell County’s history.”295  In my view, Kelly’s statement 
was more than a bit disingenuous, as if the courthouse lawn were little more than 
a community bulletin board.  Kevin Theriot responded to the en banc denial with 
a thinly veiled broadside at Jim Green: “Americans shouldn’t be forced to 
abandon their religious heritage simply to appease someone’s political agenda,” 
he said.296  “The emotional response of a single, offended passerby does not 
amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause.”297  Theriot did not mention 
that the Alliance Defense Fund has its own political and religious agenda, which 
includes “the spread of the Gospel” through legal attacks on abortion rights and 
same-sex marriage.298  The ACLU, of course, also has its own political agenda, 
supporting legal defenses of those divisive issues.299  Courtroom battles over the 
Ten Commandments have thus become skirmishes in the wider “culture war” 
between those with very different views of the proper role of religion in American 
society. 
C. How Many Times Can You Say “Historical Significance”? 
The Supreme Court granted review in the McCreary and Van Orden cases to 
resolve a “circuit split” between the appellate courts that struck down the Ten 
Commandments display in the Kentucky courthouse and upheld the monument on 
the Texas State Capitol grounds.300  However, thanks (or no thanks) to Justice 
Breyer’s concurrence in the latter case, lower-court judges have since been forced 
                                                                                                             
 293. See id. at 1246-48. 
 294. Id. at 1249. 
 295. Id. at 1235, 1238-39 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 296. Eric Young, Christian Legal Group Mulls Appeal Options Following ‘Commandments’ 
Ruling, CHRISTIAN POST, June 11, 2009, http://www.christianpost.com/article/20090611/ christian-
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 297. Id.  
 298. See About ADF, supra note 274. 
 299. See, e.g., ACLU, Key Issues, http://www.aclu.org/key-issues/relationships (last visited Oct. 
3, 2010) (listing “Reproductive Freedom” and “LGBT Rights” among fifteen key issues advocated 
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 300. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text. 
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to decide, in pending and future Ten Commandments cases, whether challenged 
displays should be governed by McCreary or by Van Orden.301  As we have seen, 
circuit courts in the Plattsmouth and Card cases relied on Van Orden for 
guidance,302 while the Tenth Circuit panel in the Green case found the challenged 
Decalogue monument more like McCreary.303 
This subsequent “circuit split,” among other things, prompted Kevin Theriot 
to ask the Supreme Court to resolve the lower-court conflicts that Breyer’s 
concurrence had produced.304  Theriot filed the certiorari petition in Green with 
the Supreme Court on October 28, 2009, quoting extensively—not 
surprisingly—from the opinions of Judges Kelly and Gorsuch, dissenting from 
the Tenth Circuit’s denial of en banc review of the unanimous panel decision.305  
He placed special emphasis on Gorsuch’s statement that “cases like Van Orden 
should come out like Van Orden.”306  Downplaying the undeniable religious 
message of the Commandments, Theriot stressed instead the purported 
“historical significance” of the Decalogue in America’s legal heritage, repeating 
this phrase no less than seven times in his thirty-three-page petition.307  Whatever 
“historical significance” the Commandments may have for residents of Haskell 
County or other communities in which they are displayed depends entirely upon 
the divine sanction they provide for the criminal prohibitions of murder, adultery, 
theft, and perjury.  Yet, as discussed above, every reputable scholar in this field 
has shown that this supposed “nexus” between the religious commands of the 
Decalogue and those prohibitions is simply lacking.308 
Theriot summed up his appeal for Supreme Court review in these words:  
 
Circuit courts need this Court’s guidance on the proper analysis to apply to 
monuments passively acknowledging religion’s historical significance that are 
part of historical displays on government grounds.  Otherwise, these cases will 
continue to be decided on irrelevant facts like those that led to the finding of 
unconstitutionality in this case.309  
  
                                                                                                             
 301. See discussion supra Parts IV, V.A-B. 
 302. See discussion supra Parts IV.B-C. 
 303. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
 304. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 22-28. 
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Theriot also identified the facts he found “irrelevant”: “the age of the monument, how 
quickly it was challenged, whether it was displayed by a small or large town, and the 
personal religious views of the government officials who allowed it.”310 
D. How Many Times Can You Say “Context”? 
Jim Green’s lawyers filed their brief in opposition to Kevin Theriot’s certiorari 
petition with the Supreme Court on January 11, 2010.311  Submitted by Dan 
Mach of the ACLU’s Washington, D.C. office as the Counsel of Record,312 the 
brief urged the Justices to deny review of the Tenth Circuit panel decision on two 
main grounds.  First, Mach argued that the religious statements of Mike Bush and 
the county commissioners, before and after the Ten Commandments monument 
was installed, demonstrated an official “endorsement” of its sectarian message.313 
 Mach devoted four pages of his brief to documenting these statements.314  
Second, and not surprisingly, he argued that the overall “context” of the 
monument distinguished it from the one on the Texas State Capitol grounds in 
the Van Orden case, making it more analogous to the Kentucky courthouse 
display in McCreary, as the Tenth Circuit panel had concluded.315  In fact, Mach 
used the words “context” and “contextual” nearly fifty times in the body of his 
thirty-four-page brief.316 
Even if the Tenth Circuit panel “had viewed this case solely through the lens of 
Van Orden,” Mach argued, the Haskell County “monument still would not have 
passed constitutional muster because there are significant, material distinctions 
between this display and the monument in Van Orden.”317  He cited such factors 
as the board members’ public support of the Haskell County monument, the lack 
of a unifying secular theme on the courthouse lawn, and the community 
“divisiveness” the monument sparked.318  Mach did not rely solely on these 
factors, however, stressing that the Tenth Circuit panel had reviewed “the record 
as a whole” in the case, and the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the 
                                                                                                             
 310. Id. at 8. 
 311. See generally Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, Haskell County Bd. of Comm’rs v. 
Green, 130 S. Ct. 1687 (2010) (No. 09-531), 2010 WL 169503. 
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monument’s erection, and had not singled out any factors as “determinative” in 
its ruling.319 
In contrast to Theriot’s petition, Mach dismissed the asserted “circuit split” 
with the decisions in the Plattsmouth and Card cases with hardly a glance, 
conceding that those monuments satisfied the factors in Justice Breyer’s Van 
Orden concurrence.320  In effect, the ACLU signaled its willingness to allow these 
and other “old” monuments, mostly donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles, to 
remain standing.  In my view, this would be an unfortunate (but understandable) 
consequence of the ACLU’s effort to confine the Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Green case, either in denying review or upholding the Tenth Circuit decision on 
the narrowest possible grounds, a strategy that lawyers often employ in dealing 
with “circuit-split” cases.  What Mach was saying, in essence, was that “cases 
like McCreary should come out like McCreary.”321  This one did, Mach 
concluded, and thus did not warrant Supreme Court review or reversal of the 
Tenth Circuit’s panel decision.322 
E. “We All Love Jesus Christ”—The Grayson Case from Kentucky 
Three days after Dan Mach filed the ACLU’s opposition brief in the Green 
case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals handed Kevin Theriot a gift-wrapped 
present for his reply brief, which he submitted to the Supreme Court on January 
25, 2010.323  Ruling on January 14, two members of a three-judge panel reversed 
a district court decision that ordered the removal of a Ten Commandments 
display from the courthouse wall in Grayson County, Kentucky.324 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in ACLU of Kentucky v. Grayson County merits 
attention for two reasons.  First, it reveals the impact on Ten Commandments 
cases of appellate judges with right-wing ideological axes to grind, who are 
willing to “distinguish” controlling precedent and distort case records to reach a 
“result-oriented” outcome.325  Second, the community response to that decision 
exposes the sectarian religious motivations of the Christian majority in Grayson 
County that supported the Decalogue display in their courthouse. 
                                                                                                             
 319. See id. at 25. 
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The Grayson case began in September 2001, when Reverend Chester Shartzer, 
pastor of the Clearview Baptist Church in the county seat of Leitchfield, appeared 
before the county’s governing body, the Grayson County Fiscal Court, expressing 
“his desire for the County to place the Ten Commandments in the County 
buildings.”326  Tucked in the coal field region of central Kentucky, Grayson 
County—much like McCreary County in the state’s eastern region—is small and 
rural,327 and conservative in politics and religion.  Its voters backed John McCain 
by a two-to-one majority over Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election,328 
and evangelical Protestants outnumber other denominations by a similar 
margin.329 
Reverend Shartzer likely knew that Judge Coffman had ruled that a display of 
the Decalogue with other “historical documents” in the McCreary County 
courthouse was a “sham” and violated the Establishment Clause.330  But he was 
not dissuaded, explaining to the Fiscal Court members that “the Civil Liberties 
would look more favorable toward it if [the Ten Commandments] were hanging 
in a grouping with the other historical documents.”331  The County’s attorney, 
Tom Goff, warned the Fiscal Court members that “there could be law suits filed 
against the County,”332 but they unanimously approved Shartzer’s request to post 
the Decalogue in the courthouse along with the “historical documents” that Judge 
Coffman had rejected in McCreary County,333 thus setting the stage for another 
Ten Commandments lawsuit. 
                                                                                                             
 326. See id. at 841 (majority opinion); see also Linda B. Blackford, Ten Commandments Back 
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Shartzer’s prediction that the ACLU “would look more favorable toward” the 
Grayson County display proved wrong.  At the request of two county residents, 
Ed Meredith and Raymond Harper, the Kentucky ACLU filed suit in 2001.334  
Once again, as in the McCreary case, Grayson County was represented by 
Mathew Staver of Liberty Counsel, among others,335 who had no doubt provided 
Shartzer with a list of the same “historical documents” that were displayed in 
McCreary County.  The Ten Commandments were removed from the Grayson 
County courthouse after federal district judge Joseph McKinley granted the 
ACLU’s preliminary injunction request, but further proceedings were placed on 
hold pending the outcome of appeals to the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court 
in McCreary.336  When he finally ruled in 2008, granting a permanent injunction 
against displaying the Ten Commandments in the courthouse, Judge McKinley 
held that county officials had “never considered a secular purpose for the 
display,” thus violating the “purpose” prong of the Lemon test.337 
When the County’s appeal from Judge McKinley’s ruling came before a three-
judge panel of the Sixth Circuit, Staver already had two sure votes in his pocket.  
Judge David McKeague was a longtime Republican activist and party official in 
Michigan, and was reportedly named to the bench by President George W. 
Bush—over the opposition of both Michigan senators—as a reward for legal 
work on behalf of Bush’s father.338  McKeague is also a member of the Federalist 
Society,339 an influential organization of conservative lawyers and judges.  Senior 
district judge Karl Forester of Kentucky, who sat on the panel by designation, had 
already upheld an identical Ten Commandments display in his district.340 
Writing for himself and Judge Forester, McKeague conceded that the 
documents in the Grayson County courthouse “match exactly” those in the 
McCreary County display the Supreme Court had ruled against.341  McKeague 
opined, however, that judges “must be alert to distinguishing facts” in similar 
                                                                                                             
 334. Grayson, 591 F.3d at 842. 
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cases.342  Lawyers and judges can always “distinguish” two cases if they try hard 
enough, and McKeague found two facts to “distinguish” the Grayson County and 
McCreary cases.  First, the Grayson display was donated by a private citizen, 
Reverend Shartzer; and second, no Grayson County officials made religious 
remarks about the display’s installation.343  Finding both “historical and 
educational” value in the display,344 McKeague deferred to the County’s “stated 
secular purpose” and held that the overall display “endorse[d] an educational 
message rather than a religious one.”345 
In a pointed dissent, Judge Karen Nelson Moore—named to the bench by 
President Bill Clinton346—took McKeague to task for ignoring the clear evidence 
in the case record that posting the Decalogue in the courthouse was considered by 
county officials as separate from and unrelated to the “historical documents” that 
surrounded it.347  Citing the minutes of the Fiscal Court meetings, she said that 
the record “clearly indicate[d] that the predominant purpose was to post the Ten 
Commandments as a religious text and that the additional, ‘Historical 
Documents’ were added merely to avoid violating the Constitution.”348  Nothing 
was said at these meetings about the “historical” or “educational” nature of the 
Decalogue, Moore observed.349  She concluded, “The County’s asserted purpose 
here—that the Display was posted for educational or historical reasons—is a 
sham and should be rejected.”350 
The response of Grayson County residents to their victory in the Sixth Circuit 
made clear their religious motivation—dismissed by Judge McKeague—in 
displaying the Decalogue in their courthouse.  On January 18, 2010, several 
hundred people gathered at the courthouse for a jubilant celebration.  “Amid 
anthems, hymns, and plenty of ‘amens,’ a copy of the Ten Commandments was 
placed back on the wall at the Grayson County courthouse,” one reporter 
wrote.351  The same reporter quoted one spectator as saying, “We all love Jesus 
Christ . . . .  This represents our savior, and it’s the law we have to go by.”352  
County magistrate Presto Gary suggested that the long legal battle had been 
worth the effort: “If we don’t get something back for Christian people to believe 
                                                                                                             
 342. Id. at 848. 
 343. See id. at 849-54. 
 344. Id. at 853. 
 345. Id. at 849, 855. 
 346. FJC Directory, supra note 271 (select “M” hyperlink from alphabetical list; then follow 
“Moore, Karen Nelson” hyperlink). 
 347. See Grayson, 591 F.3d at 857-58 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 348. Id. 
 349. See id. at 858. 
 350. Id. at 857. 
 351. See Blackford, supra note 326. 
 352. Id. 
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in, what kind of shape will our country be in?” he asked.353  “But we had faith and 
kept praying.”354  As the Ten Commandments were placed back in their frame, 
“the crowd spontaneously broke into God Bless America, and Amazing Grace.  
Afterward, everyone crowded around a big sheet cake emblazoned with an 
American flag.”355  Fittingly, the celebration ended with a prayer by Reverend 
Shartzer, who exulted,  “I’m so proud of the Christian leadership we’ve had in 
Grayson County.”356 
Needless to say, Kevin Theriot cited the Grayson decision in his reply brief for 
Green as further evidence of the “circuit split” he asked the Supreme Court to 
resolve in his favor.357  He noted that the Sixth Circuit “upheld a display identical 
to the one that this Court considered in McCreary.”358  If that were the case, one 
might ask, why wouldn’t McCreary control both the Green and Grayson cases?  
With McCreary as controlling precedent, my opinion, for what it’s worth, is that 
the Tenth Circuit got it right in Green and the Sixth Circuit got it wrong in 
Grayson. 
Conclusion: A Challenge and a “Modest Proposal” 
My argument for the presumptive unconstitutionality of Ten Commandments 
displays on public property rests on three facts.  First, the Decalogue undeniably 
is a religious text, taken from the Hebrew scriptures in the Bible and adopted as 
an article of faith by virtually all Christians, especially those in conservative 
evangelical denominations.  The first three commandments are exclusively 
religious in nature, with no “secular” meaning or force whatever.  Three other 
commandments contain moral admonitions (observe the Sabbath, honor one’s 
parents, and do not covet one’s neighbors’ goods or wives) that cannot be enacted 
into law. 
Second, the acts of murder, theft, adultery, and perjury that are prohibited by 
the other four commandments have been subject to criminal sanction and 
punishment in virtually every known code of laws, both formal and customary, 
since long before the Decalogue was incorporated into the Bible, and in societies 
that are not Jewish or Christian.  Legal historians and anthropologists agree that 
these prohibitions are universal and not culture-specific.  They simply reflect 
common recognition of the obvious harm these acts inflict on individuals and 
society, and do not depend on divine sanction.  Those who worshipped multiple 
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gods in ancient Egypt or in Hindu cultures, and even modern atheists who believe 
in no god, considered or still consider themselves bound by these prohibitions. 
Third, and most important for this argument, the alleged “nexus” between the 
Ten Commandments and contemporary American law simply does not exist.  The 
Decalogue has never been a significant “source” of that law, from the framing of 
the Constitution until today.  Without exception, reputable legal historians agree 
on this issue.  Lacking any “but-for” connection between the Commandments and 
the criminal law of every American state and the federal government, arguments 
for their display in public places rest on nothing more than the religious sentiment 
of Christian majorities. 
I welcome those Decalogue defenders who wish to rebut these claims to make 
that effort.  But I also challenge them to answer, with more than mere assertion, 
the following five questions: First, do you deny that the Decalogue is a religious 
text and rests its commandments on divine sanction?  Second, do you deny that a 
display of the first three commandments, by themselves, would violate the 
Establishment Clause?  Third, do you deny that prohibitions against murder, 
theft, adultery, and perjury have been universal in every recorded culture, before 
and after the Bible was written?  Fourth, can you identify a single reputable 
scholar who has demonstrated that the Constitution’s framers relied on the 
Decalogue as a significant source of American law?  If so, provide names, 
academic affiliations, and scholarly publications.  Fifth, can you identify a single 
Decalogue display that was not initiated by an individual or group with express 
religious professions?359 
I have a final challenge to defenders of the Haskell County monument.  In May 
2006, the commissioners—clearly on the advice of their lawyers—adopted a 
policy statement that prohibited the county from denying placement of displays 
on the courthouse lawn on the basis of viewpoint.360  Let me propose that a 
                                                                                                             
 359. It is worth noting that the Fraternal Order of Eagles, which donated the Ten 
Commandments monument at the Texas State Capitol and similar monuments to about 150 other 
towns and cities, requires that its members profess belief in a “supreme being.”  Robert V. Ritter, 
Supreme Scandal: How the Supreme Court Blessed the Ten Commandments (Nov. 23, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.jmcenter.org/pages/supreme_scandal.html.  The fraternity 
has also stated in official publications that the Decalogue embodies God’s “rules” and that “the 
kingdom of heaven belongs to those who live by them.  That was Christ’s promise to us.”  
FRATERNAL ORDER OF EAGLES, ON EAGLE WINGS 93 (1958), available at 
http://www.jmcenter.org/comicbook/OEW_093.jpg.  Thus, despite the ostensibly “secular” purpose 
of donating the monuments to combat “juvenile delinquency,” the Eagles are clearly a sectarian 
religious organization.  See generally Sue A. Hoffman, The Real History of the Ten 
Commandments Project, of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, http://www.religioustolerance.org/ 
hoffman01.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
  360. See Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of Haskell, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 
1275 n.3 (E.D. Okla. 2006), rev’d, 568 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2009); Michael Smith, Display Policy 
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county resident offer to erect a display that includes these quotes from three of 
the founding fathers: (1) “[T]he government of the United States is not in any 
sense founded on the Christian Religion”–The Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
(Tripoli), signed by President John Adams in 1796;361 (2) “Christianity neither is, 
nor ever was a part of the common law”–Thomas Jefferson;362 3) “During almost 
fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial.  What 
have been its fruits?  More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the clergy, 
ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry, and 
persecution”–James Madison.363 
This proposal would put the commissioners to the test on their supposedly 
“viewpoint-neutral” policy.  But it would promptly be rejected, unless I’m 
seriously mistaken.  In its place, let me offer a more modest proposal—that the 
commissioners replace the existing Decalogue monument with one that is headed 
“Commandments of Oklahoma Law” and states, “1) You shall not commit 
murder; 2) You shall not steal; 3) You shall not commit adultery; and 4) You 
shall not commit perjury.”364  That would convey the Decalogue’s “obey the law” 
message without any religious surplusage.  This obviously won’t happen, either, 
and the proposal is effectively mooted by the removal of the Haskell County 
monument in March 2010 to adjoining property of the American Legion.  
Nonetheless, the proposal still serves to point out (to me, at least) the hypocrisy 
of those who insist that the “obey the law” message can only be conveyed by 
display of all ten commandments, and puts supporters of this and other 
Decalogue monuments (such as that proposed on the Oklahoma State Capitol 
grounds) to the test for adherence to supposedly “viewpoint-neutral” policies.   
Finally, I’m not so naïve as to believe that any federal judge or Supreme Court 
Justice will agree that public display of the Decalogue is presumptively 
unconstitutional, although acceptance of my argument would spare them the 
onerous task of deciding whether a challenged display (like that in Haskell 
County) is more like McCreary or Van Orden.  However, I would propose that 
they apply, in pending and future cases, the “endorsement” test of Justice 
O’Connor and the “purpose” and “effect” prongs of the Lemon test.  If they do, 
as did the Tenth Circuit panel in the Green case, it seems clear to me that such 
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displays will be struck down as violations of the Establishment Clause.  The 
Supreme Court’s denial of Haskell County’s certiorari petition in March 2010 
leaves a final resolution of this issue still unclear, however, since (at this writing) 
the Court has not ruled on the certiorari petition filed by Liberty Counsel in the 
second round of the McCreary case, wherein the Counsel has asked for review of 
the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on remand affirming Judge Coffman’s grant of a 
permanent injunction in that case.365  We should learn the fate of this latest 
petition by late February or March 2011, but I’m virtually certain the Court will 
deny it, given the factual similarities of the McCreary County and Haskell County 
cases.  I may, of course, be wrong.  In the meantime, I hope readers of this essay 
will consider seriously the argument I have presented, and I welcome their 
responses.  
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